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This work began as a study of the relationships among technological innova- 
tion, productivity change, and profits, in the context of a competitive industry 
experiencing rapid shifts in the markets for its inputs and outputs. The focus is 
the nineteenth-century  New Bedford whaling industry. Whaling was chosen 
because the natural resource  (whales) was equally available to all competi- 
tors-both  domestic and foreign. Since there were no property rights carrying 
with them implicit rents, the analytical task of  sorting out the relationships 
among technology, productivity, and profits was  simplified. The nineteenth 
century encompassed  most  of  the  last  stage of  the  industry-the  pelagic 
stage-before  the advent of modern whaling. During this period the American 
fleet rose to world leadership and then collapsed-posing  important historical 
and analytical issues. New Bedford was chosen because it sent out about one- 
half of American whaling voyages. 
The study has shown that, although the choice of  industry simplified the 
problem of identifying technical change and assessing its impact, it certainly 
did not solve it. It has been necessary to consider changes in the markets for 
labor and capital and for oil and bone, to say nothing of the quality of  the 
entrepreneurial input that directed and combined capital and labor. 
There was a substantial American whaling industry in the years before the 
Revolution. By  1814 two wars and a prohibitive British tariff had virtually 
destroyed it. In 1815 the industry began to rebuild itself, and over the years 
1816-20 its agents directed each year more than half a hundred whalers aggre- 
gating almost twenty thousand tons, with an average annual catch valued at 
about $750,000 (in 1880 dollars). 
Twenty-five years later, American agents directed 672 vessels valued at $21 
million (1880 prices), and the industry employed 16,600 seamen. In 1860 the 
annual value of the industry’s output reached almost $8 million, which made 
it larger than 583 of the nation’s 631 manufacturing industries. That value, ac- 
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cording to the census, resulted from the sale of 2,695,000 gallons of sperm oil, 
7,413,000  gallons of whale oil, and  3,196,000 pounds of  bone-with  New 
Bedford  contributing  more  than  one-half  (U.S. Census  Office  1866, 550; 
The expansion was not limited to vessels,  men, and product; it was geo- 
graphic as well. At the time of the Revolution, American whalers operated over 
most of the Atlantic-as  far north as Baffin Bay, east to the coast of Africa, 
and as far south as Patagonia. In 1791 the Rebecca followed the British Emilia 
around Cape Horn and into the Pacific. By the mid-1830s American whalemen 
had pushed the industry’s Pacific boundaries first into the center of that ocean 
and then to the coast of Japan; in the Indian Ocean they had hunted as far north 
as the Red Sea. During the next fifteen years Pacific operations expanded into 
the Gulf of Alaska and the  Sea of  Okhotsk, and in  1848 the first American 
whalers entered the Western Arctic. 
By that time captains and crewmen were well acquainted with sperm, right, 
gray, and humpback whales, and they had begun to speak rhapsodically about 
the western bowheads encountered in the North Pacific and Western Arctic. 
The Americans, for all their whaling prowess, however, had not managed to 
capture  a  significant  number  of  the  fast-swimming  rorquals-blues,  seis, 
minkes, and finners-that  were to be the foundation of modem whaling. 
Midcentury marked the zenith of the American effort. Although the industry 
recovered slightly from the depredations of the Confederate raiders Alabama 
and Shenundoah, the contraction that began in the mid-I 850s continued almost 
unabated until the industry was wound up in the  1920s.’ By the beginning of 
the twentieth century, the value of whaling output was less than  10 percent of 
its earlier peak. Between  1901 and  1905 the forty-odd remaining vessels- 
aggregating about ten  thousand tons-returned  an annual average of about 
600,000 gallons of sperm oil, 95,000 gallons of whale oil, and 100,000 pounds 
of bone. 
What,  then,  was  the  relationship  between  technology  and  productivity 
change in this evolving industry? What caused its rapid increase in output, 
and what caused its equally rapid contraction? The standard account points to 
increasing demand for oil and bone as the engine of expansion and to decreas- 
ing demand coupled with an exhaustion of whale stocks-the  result of over- 
hunting-as  the  causes  of  contraction.  Since it was  the American,  not the 
world, industry that declined, it has also been suggested that the failure of this 
nation’s whaling entrepreneurs to capitalize on the new techniques and markets 
exploited by the Norwegians was a factor. 
It does not take a study of technology or productivity to show that changes 
in demand were important.  Despite the increase in the American output of 
sperm oil from an annual average of 723,000 gallons in 1816-20 to an annual 
1865,733-42). 
1. The voyage of the John R. Manta in 1925 was the “last successful whaling voyage from New 
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average of 4,627,000 gallons in 1836-40, the real price of sperm oil increased 
over the period from $0.61 to $0.93 per gallon. For  whale oil the increase 
from an annual average of  820,000 gallons in 1816-20  to 7,875,000 gallons 
in  1846-50  was accompanied by  a price increase from $0.33 to $0.45. For 
whalebone, too, increased prices accompanied increased outputs: the annual 
average output of 50,000 pounds in  1816-20  sold for $0.08 a pound, that of 
3,394,400 in 185  1-55  for $0.42. 
Similarly, the  79 percent  fall in the American  average annual output of 
sperm oil, from 2,560,000 to 536,000 gallons, between 1856-60  and 1901-5 
coincided with a 54 percent decline in its real price-from  $1.39 to $0.64- 
and the collapse of the whale oil market, a 97 percent fall in output between 
1861-65  and 1901-5,  was accompanied by a 3  1 percent decline in price. 
These movements are consistent with developments in the market for the 
industry’s final products. During the Golden Age the tripling of the nation’s 
population raised domestic-lighting demand, foreign demand increased, and 
the rapid growth of the manufacturing  sector caused a large increase in the 
demand for lubricants. As knowledge of  its strength  and flexibility spread, 
whalebone demand increased as well. 
The industry’s decline coincided, first, with the development of new illumi- 
nants and lubricants such as manufactured gas and lard oil, second, with the 
discovery of petroleum, and finally, with the innovation of fractional distilla- 
tion. Petroleum provided a substitute for sperm and whale oil as illurninants; 
distillation reduced the price of the substitute (kerosene) and produced a steady 
flow of  inexpensive substitutes for whale-based lubricants as by-products of 
the refining process. The skyrocketing demand for whalebone-real  prices in- 
creased almost fifteenfold between 1854 and 1904-was  due to women’s fash- 
ions (which called for wasp-waisted corsets) and to manufacturers’ desire for 
a material that was both strong and flexible.z Whalebone alone prolonged the 
life of the American industry for at least fifteen years, despite the near total 
collapse of the markets for oil. 
Demand forces, however, do not tell the entire story. Output of sperm oil fell 
by 44 percent between  1836-40  and 1856-60,  despite a price increase of 64 
percent. In the case of whale oil, output fell by almost two-thirds in the fifteen 
years after 1846-50,  in the face of a near 170 percent increase in real prices. 
For a complete explanation of the industry’s response to changes in its eco- 
nomic environment, it is necessary to explore supply responses in addition to 
shifts in demand. In particular the relationships among changes in the stocks 
of whales, the evolution of factor (particularly labor) priqes, and the invention 
and innovation of  new technologies must be examined. ’he  productivity re- 
gressions provide an analytical vehicle that can be used to begin such an exami- 
nation. (See table 8.2.) 
Although measured productivity was subject to violent year-to-year fluctua- 
2. The whalebone price increase was also importantly due to the decline in supply. 516  Chapter 14 
tions, over time a moving average of the productivity index for the New Bed- 
ford fleet makes a pattern similar to that of a jump rope held at one end by a 
ten-year-old  girl and at the other by her six-year-old brother. The index aver- 
aged about 1.2 in the decade 1820-30,  fell sharply (to about 0.9) over the next 
five years, levelled off over the next fifteen, and then gradually declined (to 
about 0.4) between 1850  and the end of the Civil War. Thereafter, as the indus- 
try continued to contract, the trend in productivity was reversed. Between the 
mid- 1860s and the end of the century, it more than doubled-reaching,  by the 
mid- 1890~  the level of  1835-50. 
The regression analysis provides insights into the sources of the movements 
in the index. Four results stand out. First, while there may have been overhunt- 
ing of some whales in some grounds (of right whales in the North Pacific, for 
example), there is no evidence that American whaling contracted because of a 
serious shortage of whales. An increase in the hunting-pressure index appears 
to have no large, unfavorable impact on productivity. Collateral evidence indi- 
cates that Americans did hunt  the Pacific gray whale almost to the point of 
extinction, but the massacres in the Baja calving grounds occurred after whal- 
ing had begun  its long-term decline, and grays were never an important part 
of the American effort. Furthermore, Americans made no serious inroads into 
sperm-whale or humpback stocks, and the industry had been long in decline 
before the hunting of bowheads had a substantial impact on bowhead numbers. 
Second, whaling productivity was adversely affected by the competition for 
labor from shore-based industry. The negative relationships between produc- 
tivity and both the common wage ashore and the ratio of  skilled to common 
wages are strong. As the internal economy developed, the increased demand 
for workers pushed wages up, and many of the best crewmen were bid away 
from the  sea. Throughout  the nineteenth  century, cheap labor was a key  to 
profitable whaling. The British had been successful as long as they could draw 
on the Shetland Islanders, whose opportunity cost was almost nil; the Norwe- 
gians became successful not only because of their willingness to innovate new 
technologies and open new markets, but also because of the supply of cheap 
domestic labor-the  product of Norway’s rapid rate of population growth and 
slow rate of industrialization. 
Third, it is clear that the industry’s entrepreneurs and managers made sig- 
nificant contributions to productivity (see chapter  10). In the case of agents, 
the choice of vessels (the early substitution of ships for brigs, barks, and schoo- 
ners, and later the substitution of barks for ships), the substitution of larger for 
smaller vessels, and the decision to shift operations from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific, Indian, and Western Arctic, all contributed to increased productivity. 
A good captain also made an important difference in a voyage’s success. 
The agents’ and captains’ efforts would not have been sufficient to sustain pro- 
ductivity in the face of the siren call of the manufacturing sector had it not been 
for the potential productivity of new technologies, both process and institutional. 
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general vessel design is picked up in the “mode of entry to the fleet.” By the 
early  1850s hulls had been largely redesigned, there had been a “revolution 
aloft”  with  greater numbers of  smaller,  flat, canvas  sails replacing the very 
large and heavy hemp sails, and the first steps had been taken in the science of 
naval architecture. The impact of  these changes can be seen in the near 20 
percent productivity differential between merchant ships built before 1850 and 
those built after. 
Rerigged  vessels-almost  always  ships rerigged  as barks-proved  more 
productive than the vessels that remained rigged as they were built. The devel- 
opment of an efficient winch reduced the labor required to raise the lateen sail 
on the mizzen and made it feasible to operate barks of upwards of four hundred 
tons. Given equal size, barks had always tended to be more productive than 
ships. They had more clearance for the aft boats, and they were easier for ship- 
keepers to handle when the majority of the crew were in the boats. With the 
opening of the Western Arctic (and later with the reopening of the grounds in 
Hudson Bay and Davis Strait), the greater maneuverability of barks made them 
substantially more productive than ships. 
The regressions do not indicate, however, that vessels built especially for 
whaling were more productive than others. The finding is surprising, and there 
is no obvious explanation for it. 
The crew-quality variables  also appear to pick up some of the effects of 
technical progress, particularly the innovations aloft in sails and rigging and in 
the design of the steering mechanism. In the regressions, productivity is posi- 
tively associated with the fraction of the crew that was illiterate and with the 
fraction  that  was unskilled.  It appears that the  new  sail plans  and  steering 
mechanisms allowed the substitution of  mates and illiterate greenhands for 
skilled and semi-skilled seamen, whose wages were relatively high. The statis- 
tical  results  should  not  be  interpreted  to  mean  that  less-qualified  seamen 
caused higher productivity. Rather, the skill mix of whaling crews reflected 
the technical characteristics  of  the vessels. Vessels with advanced technical 
configurations-thus  more productive  vessels-could  be managed by crews 
with relatively  large numbers of  unskilled seamen. The high productivity  of 
those vessels reflected their technical characteristics,  not the low quality of 
their seamen. 
The positive sign on the technological dummy probably reflects chiefly the 
effects of improvements in whalecraft. Better charts and better vessel design 
may  also figure in this result, although the latter should be captured in the 
vessel-design  variables. By  1870 the toggle iron had effectively replaced the 
two-flued iron; virtually  all vessels carried steel lances and whale guns that 
delivered explosive lances. Many vessels, especially those in the Western Arc- 
tic, carried darting guns. These innovations greatly increased the probability 
that  a  whale,  once harpooned,  would  be killed  and  recovered.  Fewer  lost 
whales meant increased productivity, the same number of attacks yielding oil 
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One institutional innovation, although not affecting the trend, did affect the 
level of productivity of the American fleet. The Americans early adopted the 
lay system of payment. Every member of the ship’s company from captain to 
cabin boy  signed on, not for a wage or piece rate, but for a predetermined 
percentage  of  the value of the product returned. The system had  a positive 
impact not only on profitability, transferring a part of the risk from entrepre- 
neur to crewman, but also on productivity. Nineteenth-century whaling was a 
cooperative enterprise. A boat’s crew had to work closely together, if a whale 
was to be  successfully taken, and a vessel’s crew had to work together, if  a 
carcass was to be efficiently reduced to oil. The lay system rewarded coopera- 
tive, not individual, effort. 
If the lay system affected only the level of the index, two other institutional 
innovations affected its time path. As whalers ranged farther and farther from 
New Bedford, the time lost travelling to and from the whaling  grounds in- 
creased. In order to overcome the transport capacity constraint imposed by the 
size of the whaling vessel, agents began to use distant ports-Honolulu,  La- 
haina, Sydney, San Francisco, Port Louis-as  transshipment points. A whaler 
could leave New Bedford, travel to the North Pacific or Western Arctic, hunt 
for a season, offload at Lahaina, and return to the hunt for a second season. 
Sometimes the process was repeated three or four times. In the decade 1816- 
25, before agents had begun  to transship the catch, a typical  Pacific voyage 
lasted slightly more than twenty-four months; fifty years later the figure had 
almost doubled. 
Finally, the American whaleman benefitted from the government’s decision 
to socialize exploration, hydrography, and ocean cartography. In the late 1830s 
Congress financed a five-year effort to explore and survey the Pacific coast and 
the South Seas and, fifteen years later, a similar venture designed to explore 
“and reconnaisance-the  courses of navigation used by whalers in the regions 
of Behring’s Straits; also such parts of the China Seas, Straits of Gaspar, and 
Java Sea as lie directly in the route of vessels proceeding to and from China” 
(WSL  3 August 1852). Both expeditions ended with the publication and wide- 
spread dissemination of accounts of their findings and maps of the regions. 
Also at midcentury  the navy’s Hydrographic Office, under the direction of 
Matthew  Fontaine  Maury,  began  systematically  to  collect  information  on 
winds, ocean currents, magnetic deflections, and weather. Drawing on the re- 
ports filed by a substantial fraction of  the nation’s  sea and whaling captains, 
Maury constructed a series of maps that spelled out the best routes for sailing 
ships to follow at various times of the year on all standard voyages. The work 
resulted in major reductions  in average voyage lengths for American sailing 
vessels and greater productivity for American whalers. 
Clearly, one major explanation of the demise of the American industry was 
the decline of the markets for sperm and whale oil beginning in the  1850s, 
and, three decades later, of the market for bone as well. New technologies were 
developed and innovated, and they appear to have reversed the downward slide 519  In Retrospect 
She struck where the white and fleecy waves 
But the cruel rocks, they gored her sides 
Looked soft as carded wool, 
Like the horns of an angry bull. 
The Wreck of  the Hesperus, Longfellow 
Wrecks ended the careers of many New Bedford vessels. The Citizen, a Sag Harbor 
whaler, was transferred into the California trade and then brought back east to join the 
New Bedford whaling fleet. On her next voyage-her  first out of New Bedford-the 
whaler was lost with six of her crew. A seventh died later from injuries sustained in 
the wreck. 
Drawing reproduced from The Arctic Whaleman, by  Lewis Holmes, 1857, courtesy 
of the Old Dartmouth Historical Society-New Bedford Whaling Museum. 
in measured  productivity  and somewhat  prolonged  the life of the industry. 
They were not, however, sufficient to save it. 
Within a decade of the time that the American industry began to decline in 
the  1850s, in and off Finnmark-Norway’s  most northern  province-Svend 
Foyn began an enterprise that launched modem whaling. The new enterprise 
differed in the products it produced, in the technology it employed, and in the 
species of whales it caught. 
With the demise of  the lighting market, whalemen were left with a much 
smaller number of consumers-those  who continued to need oil for lubrica- 
tion; for the manufacture of soft soaps, jute, and textiles; for tanning; for tem- 
pering steel; and for tinning. Given the much reduced demand, it was difficult 
for a firm to survive if it gained no more than  the 40 to 50 percent of  the 
whale’s oil that was found in the blubber. Foyn’s factories retrieved more of the 
oil. In addition, the bones were ground for “guano”;  when the oil had been 520  Chapter 14 
boiled out, the remaining carcass-high  in protein-was  sold as cattle feed; 
the meat was canned and sold as canned beef or meat cakes; and even the glue 
water, the liquid left over from the boiling and bone-cleaning processes, was 
turned into a salable product-glue. 
The technology  innovated by  Foyn was new. His was no longer a pelagic 
industry. Whales were hunted at sea, but processing was done at shore stations. 
In  fact, it  would  have  been  impossible  to  render  an  entire  whale  on  a 
nineteenth-century  whaling  vessel.  Moreover,  the  hunt  was  no longer  con- 
ducted from a sail- and oar-powered whaleboat, but from a much larger, iron- 
hulled, steam-powered killer boat armed with whaling cannon. Contrast Foyn’s 
first killer boat, the Spes er Fides-almost  ninety-five feet long, powered by a 
twenty-horsepower  engine,  capable  of  seven  knots,  and  armed  with  seven 
whale guns-with  the twenty-five-  to twenty-eight-foot  wooden  boats  that 
Americans used to attack whales. To  complete the transition, in  1872 Foyn 
received a patent on a shell harpoon-a  combination harpoon and grenade- 
that killed the whale instantly and could be fired from a gun mounted on the 
bow of the killer boat. 
Although Foyn probably never saw a whale he didn’t like, the new technol- 
ogy permitted him to hunt  the fast-swimming  rorquals that had  theretofore 
escaped the whalemen’s harpoons. He was thus able to benefit from a sudden 
increase in the economic supply of whales, a supply initially located within a 
day’s sail of his factory. 
The Norwegians did their best to keep their techniques secret, but the tech- 
nology was certainly known to the Germans and the Scots, and it is unlikely 
that the same information was not also available to potential American entre- 
preneurs. Over the decade  1863-72,  when Foyn perfected  his hunting tech- 
niques, an American, Thomas Welcome Roys, was also working on a new tech- 
nology that would allow him to hunt rorquals successfully. During those ten 
years his record for catching them was almost identical to Foyn’s, but Roys lost 
most of his catch: the whales sank. 
Why didn’t  New  Bedford  whaling entrepreneurs  innovate  the Norwegian 
techniques and move into the new industry? Distance may have precluded op- 
erations in Finnmark or Spitsbergen, but Iceland was not much farther from 
New Bedford than it was from Sandefjord, the principal Norwegian whaling 
port, and Newfoundland was certainly closer. Is whaling an example of Ameri- 
can entrepreneurial failure? 
Several factors appear to explain the American decision not to pursue the 
new opportunities, and none involves the quality of New Bedford entrepreneur- 
ship. In the first place the new system of  whaling made the entire American 
capital stock-both  physical and human-completely  obsolete. Wooden ves- 
sels could play  no role, and not only was there  no use for the stockpiles of 
whaleboats, harpoons, and lances, but not even the recently acquired darting 
guns had  a place on the modern whaler.  Since the whales hunted were not 
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knowledge about hunting grounds, migration patterns, and whale behavior that 
captains and agents had gained over the previous decades was no longer of any 
value. The same was true of the skills that had been developed to attack and 
kill those animals. Successful entry into modem whaling would have required 
an entire new capital stock. 
In the second place the Americans had benefitted from the nation’s compara- 
tive advantage in the design and manufacture of wooden sailing vessels. They 
had no such advantage in the case of  iron-hulled steamships; in fact, the na- 
tion’s comparative disadvantage would almost certainly have forced whalemen 
to turn to Britain for killer ships. Clearly they had no edge over actual Norwe- 
gian, or potential British, competitors. 
In the final analysis, however, it was the matter of  opportunity costs that 
doomed the American enterprise. The whales belonged to anyone who could 
successfully hunt them, but capital, labor, and entrepreneurial ability all had 
some national ties. American agents had employed men from distant places- 
for example, from the Cape Verde Islands and the islands of the South Seas- 
but untrained Americans still made up part of the crews, and almost all of the 
officers came from New England. Labor had always been relatively expensive 
in this country; after 1840 it became increasingly so. Between the 1860s and 
the  1880s the wages of  common  laborers increased by  about one-third and 
stood in the  1880s at about $1.30 a day. Common labor in Norway could be 
hired for $0.30, and a seaman on a whaler earned only $0.48. Over the same 
two decades the wages of skilled American workers grew even faster, with the 
ratio of wages of skilled to those of unskilled workers increasing from about 
1.6 to about 1  .9.3 
In a similar vein the owners of both capital and entrepreneurial talent found 
the rewards in activities closer to home continually more attractive. The bur- 
geoning manufacturing and transport  sectors were drawing capital; for those 
of a somewhat more risk-taking proclivity, opportunities in the West were ex- 
panding rapidly. Even the great whaling families were not slow to take advan- 
tage of these new opportunities. The Rotches invested in railroads, toll roads, 
banks, insurance companies, and real estate. Charles W.  Morgan invested in an 
ironworks. The Howlands also saw potential profits in the railroads, and their 
investments helped make New Bedford the third leading center of cotton tex- 
tile manufacture in Massachusetts. Nor were whaling agents loath to turn their 
entrepreneurial skills to these alternative pursuits. The Howlands provided a 
part of the entrepreneurial force behind New Bedford’s first cotton mill; Wes- 
ton Howland opened the city’s first petroleum-refining plant. 
Thus, while the free availability of the ocean’s whales made it possible for 
the United States to achieve its midcentury leadership in whaling, in the long 
3. Norwegian wages, expressed in @re,  are from T~nnessen  and Johnsen 1982, 12, 13. American 
unskilled wages are from Abbott 1905, 361. The skilled to unskilled (artisans to laborers) ratio is 
from Williamson and Lindert 1980, 306. 522  Chapter 14 
run that availability made it possible for the Norwegians to dislodge the Ameri- 
cans from that position. Lower wages, lower opportunity costs of capital, and 
a lack of  entrepreneurial alternatives pushed the Norwegians into exploiting 
the  whale stocks. Higher  wages,  higher  opportunity  costs of  capital, and a 
plethora of  entrepreneurial  alternatives  turned Americans-even  those from 
New Bedford-toward  the domestic economy. 